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The effect of Investor Protection and IFRS Adoption on Earnings 
Quality around the World 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the effect of investor protection and IFRS on the quality of 
accounting earnings for forty-six countries around the globe. Two attributes of 
accounting earnings are studied: the magnitude of discretionary accruals, and the 
avoidance of loss reporting. The results suggest that IFRS adoption per se doest not 
lead to increased earnings quality, at least based on the earnings attributes studied in 
our study. Specifically, accounting earnings quality improves as investor protection 
regimes become stronger, but only for IFRS adopting countries, that is, the effect of 
investor protection is mediated through the adoption of IFRS. The results highlight 
the importance of accounting enforcement to financial reporting quality and the need 
for standard setters and policy makers to design mechanisms that will limit managers’ 
earnings management practices. 
 
 
Key words: Earnings quality, Discretionary accruals, micro governance, and macro 
governance etc 
 
JEL classification: J3; K2; M4. 
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The effect of Investor Protection and IFRS Adoption on Earnings 
Quality around the World 
 
1. Introduction 
The Conceptual Framework identifies relevance and reliability as the key 
qualitative characteristics determining the usefulness of accounting information for 
making economic decisions. Accounting earnings information is relevant when it 
influences users’ decisions by helping them to form predictions and/or confirm or 
correct past judgments. Accounting earnings information is reliable if it can be 
depended upon to faithfully represent, without bias or undue error, the transactions or 
events that it professes to represent (Statement of Accounting Concepts – SAC 3 
[Australia]; Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts – SFAC 2 [US]). Recent 
research suggests that strong investor protection, strong legal enforcement, and a 
common law legal system are fundamental determinants of high-quality financial 
statement numbers (La porta et al. 1998; 2000; 2006; Leuz et al. 2003; Ball et al. 2000; 
Ball et al. 2003; Nabar and Boonlert U-Thai 2007; Francis and Wang 2008; and 
Daske et al. 2008). However, a further likely important determinant of the quality of 
accounting information is adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Around 100 
countries have now adopted IFRS, including the EU countries, Australia, New 
Zealand and many developing countries. While this has resulted in a substantial 
reduction in national accounting differences, there continue to be significant 
differences in earnings quality.
1
 
The present international accounting scene provides a good opportunity to 
address the impact of international governance arrangements – corporate, political, 
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 Possible differences in the quality of earnings across IFRS countries might relate to variance in 
enforcement (Sunder 1997). 
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judicial and bureaucratic – on earnings quality. We argue that earnings quality is a 
joint function of investor protection and the quality of accounting standards, as 
proxied by IFRS. The broad premise of our study is based on the established argument 
that accounting does not exist in a vacuum, rather it ‘is a product of its environment’ 
(for example, Karim 1995; Mueller 1968; Nobes 1988 and 1992). Therefore, poor 
earnings quality is more likely to take place in countries with lower investor 
protection and absence of IFRS.  In succinct terms, lower investor protection breeds 
managerial discretion and managerial discretion in the organization impedes 
production of high quality accounting numbers, even given high quality accounting 
standards. Accounting corruption would tend to go hand-in-hand with socio-political 
corruption. Clean and reliable financial information, therefore, remain elusive in a low 
investor protection environment. 
This paper contributes to the literature that examines how country-level 
corporate governance such as, the regulatory system and the existence and 
enforcement of laws, and other institutional factors affect the quality of reported 
financial information. Two attributes of earnings are examined that have been widely 
used in the prior literature: the magnitude of signed discretionary accruals, and 
avoidance of reporting loss. Using a sample of over 115,608 firm year observations 
from 46 countries for the years 1998 -2007, we show that IFRS is an important 
institutional factor that affects a country’s earnings quality, and this effect exists even 
after controlling for investor protection, legal enforcement, a country’s economic 
development. We highlight the importance of the regulatory system, investor 
protection, and law enforcement; but at the same time IFRS is important. These 
findings are consistent with the argument that cross-country differences in accounting 
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quality are likely to remain after IFRS adoption until all institutional differences are 
removed (Soderstrom and Sun 2007; and Daske et al. 2008). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section begins with a 
theoretical framework that outlines the expected determinants of earnings quality. 
Then, our hypotheses are developed on the basis of this conceptual framework. 
Section 3 develops our investor protection variables. Section 4 describes the measures 
for the dependent, independent and control variables and the sample selection 
procedure. Section 5 presents our empirical results. The study concludes in section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and hypothesis development 
According to Soderstrom and Sun (2007), there are three possible scenarios 
regarding IFRS and accounting quality around the world. The first scenario is that 
adopting a common set of accounting standards improves earnings quality through the 
ease of monitoring and comparison of financial reports across boarders, which puts 
pressure on management to report true and fair view and engage in less earnings 
management activities. Using this line of thought, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) find 
that high quality accounting standards reduce earnings management and improve 
reporting quality. Similarly Schipper (2005) argues that the adoption of IFRS in the 
European Union (EU) provides a more powerful setting to test the determinants and 
economic consequences of accounting quality because accounting standards across 
EU countries are now the same. Barth et al. (2006) suggest that firms that adopt IFRS 
are less prone to engage in earnings smoothing and are more likely to recognize losses 
in a timely manner. 
Contrary to above arguments, van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), and Lin 
and Paananen (2007) examine the discretionary accruals of German firms adopting 
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IFRS and find that IFRS firms have more discretionary accruals and a lower 
correlation between accruals and cash flows. Similarly Paananen (2008) investigates 
whether the quality of financial reporting in Sweden increased after the adoption of 
IFRS and finds that the quality of financial reporting (measured as smoothing of 
earnings) decreased after the adoption of IFRS. Platikanova and Nobes (2006) 
compare the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread among 
companies before and after the EU’s adoption of IFRS in 2005. They find a larger 
volatility in the information asymmetry for UK and German companies. They also 
find that companies from countries where earnings management is more common 
exhibit a lower information asymmetry component compared to other groups of 
countries. They interpret this result as indicating that income smoothing reduces 
information asymmetry. 
The second scenario is that earnings quality is also significantly determined by 
a countries overall institutional system i.e. legal and political systems (Ball et al. 
2000; 2003) so that the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings quality will vary across 
countries. Leuz et al. (2003) examined the relationship between investor protection 
and earnings management across 31 countries using non-financial industry data. They 
find that strong investor protection at a country level reduces the earnings 
management activities of firms which leads to higher accounting quality. Following 
the above studies, Shen and Chih (2005) use banking industry data to calculate 
earnings management across 48 countries based on the methodologies of DeGeorge et 
al (1999) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Their results show that accounting 
disclosure (proxied by strong legal enforcement) more effectively explains variations 
in earnings management across countries. Similarly, prior research indicates that in 
countries with strong investor protection regimes there is greater financial 
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transparency (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Bushman et al. 2004), and less earnings 
management - all of which can be interpreted as evidence of higher accounting quality 
(Ball et al. 2000; Hung 2000; La porta et al. 1998, 2000, 2006; Daske et al. 2008). 
Ball et al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary 
condition for acquiring high quality information, without being a sufficient one .i.e. 
country level investor protection. 
The third scenario draws on recent research by Burgstahler et al. (2007). They 
examine the relation between earnings management and the interaction among 
ownership structure, capital market structure and development, tax system, accounting 
standards, and investor protection. They find that strong legal systems are associated 
with higher quality earnings. Similarly, Leuz et al. (2003) find that firms in countries 
with developed equity markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights, and legal 
enforcement engage in less earnings management i.e. high quality earnings. Ding et 
al. (2007) investigate how a country’s legal systems, economic development, the 
importance of stock markets, and ownership concentration shape the countries 
accounting standards, which in turn affect the country’s quality of financial reporting. 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) argue that cross-country differences in accounting quality 
are likely to remain following IFRS adoption, because accounting quality is a function 
of the firm’s overall institutional setting, including the legal and political system of 
the country in which the firm resides. 
In recent studies, researchers argue that the enforcement of accounting 
standards is an important as the accounting standards (e.g. Sunder 1997). Strong IFRS 
enforcement puts pressure on management and auditors who are thus less prone to 
exercise discretion (FEE, 2002, 29). Holthausen (2003) provides evidence that 
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adopting IAS
2
 with weak investor protection will likely lead to ruining the perceived 
quality of the international accounting standards, and suggests that it would be useful 
for the literature to begin to structure and quantify the country descriptions by 
developing more informative tests. Yu (2005) finds that IAS, accrual-based 
accounting standards, accounting standards with increased disclosure requirements, 
and separation of tax and financial reporting all constrain earnings management. He 
also suggests that high quality accounting standards decrease analyst forecast error. 
Hope (2003) develops a comprehensive measure of accounting standards enforcement 
and suggests that strong investor protection encourages managers to follow the rules. 
Based on the above arguments, the relevant research questions are: 
Hypothesis 1: Earnings quality is positively associated with investor protection. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Earnings quality is positively associated with IFRS adoption. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Earnings quality is positively associated with the interaction effect 
between investor protection and IFRS adoption. 
 
3. Investor protection Variable 
We use multiple investor protection measures because single country-level 
metrics are likely to be subject to measurement error and because there are multiple 
dimensions to the concept of investor protection. This testing of multiple measures is 
common in cross-country research and greater confidence is held in the results if they 
are consistent across the different measures. 
Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) study the influence of the incentives of managers 
and auditors on the properties of reported accounting numbers under high quality 
accounting standards. However, they find that earnings reported in four East Asian 
countries exhibit properties similar to code law accounting, even though these 
countries have common law standard setting and their (then) recent standards closely 
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  IAS were the predecessors of IFRS.  
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resemble International Accounting Standards. They conclude that auditor and 
manager incentives influence choice among accountings standards, and thus the 
quality of reported earnings. Similarly, Francis and Wang (2008) find that earnings 
quality is higher as the country’s investor protection regime becomes stronger, but 
only for firms with Big 4 auditors. External stakeholders expect a Big 4 auditor to 
limit earnings management and, more generally, ensure fair financial reporting. Thus, 
stakeholders are more likely to sue the auditor if they perceive a failure in financial 
reporting (Palmrose 1987, 1988; Stice 1991; Francis et al. 1994; Lys and Watts 1994). 
The public company accounting oversight Board (PCAOB) explains: 
The media, litigants, the congress, and others often allege, rightly or wrongly, that 
audit failures contributed to many business failures. In that context, the public 
views audit failure as including not only the failure to discover and report 
material negative facts, but also the failure of financial statements to serve as an 
adequately early-warning device for the protection on investors and creditors. 
 
DeAngelo (1981) explain that Big 4 auditors in the US impose a high level of 
earnings quality in order to protect their brand name from legal exposure and 
reputation risk which can arise from misleading financial reports by clients and, in 
particular, from overly optimistic earnings reports. Similarly, Krishnan (2003) finds 
that Big 4 auditors mitigate accruals-based earnings management more than non Big 4 
auditors and, therefore influence the quality of earnings. If this observation is right 
then we should observe similar results in other countries with strong investor 
protection. So our first measure of investor protection is Big 4 versus non-Big 4 
auditors and is coded 1 for firms audited by Big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise. 
Our other measures of investor protection are indexes of: board effectiveness, 
enforcement of securities laws, protection of minority shareholder rights, enforcement 
of accounting & auditing standards, and judicial independence, all provided by the 
World Economic Forum (2008).  The measures are coded from 1 to 7 with, for 
example, a value of 1 for the board effectiveness index signifying that management 
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has little accountability and 7 signifying that boards exert strong supervision of 
management decisions. We also include a measure of the freedom of the press (World 
Bank 2006) 
Boards play an important role as independent scrutinizers of management 
actions, and in protection of shareholder wealth. The literature on governance 
emphasises the role played by independent boards in ameliorating agency problems 
between the divergent interests of the shareholders and management of the company 
through monitoring of managerial behaviour (Peasnell et al 2005). Moreover, Fama 
(1980) argues that independent directors have an incentive to protect shareholders 
wealth in their role on the board of directors in order to protect the value of their 
reputation capital. Peasnell et al (2006), Houqe et al. (2009) and Ebrahim (2007) find 
that companies with a high proportion of independent directors on the board tend to 
have lower abnormal accruals. Liu and Lu (2002) find that the earnings management 
endeavors of managers in China are constrained to a certain extent if firms are 
dominated by outside directors and the shares are traded by foreign investors. 
From Hung (2000), Ball et al. (2000), Leuz et al. (2003), Daske et al. (2008), 
Laporta et al. (1998, 2000, 2006), and Francis and Wang (2008), it follows that 
countries with weak protection for minority shareholders interests provide greater 
incentives as well as opportunities for managers to engage in corrupt accounting 
practices. 
Enforcement of securities laws may deter insiders from manipulating earnings 
to profit from trading in the firm’s shares (Hope 2003). Beneish and Vargus (2002) 
provide evidence that insider trading is associated with earnings management. 
Aboody et al. (2005) find that privately informed traders earn greater profits when 
trading stocks with high earnings quality risk factors. 
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Economic theory proposes that a strong institutional setting arises to alleviate 
information and transaction costs.  Much empirical work has tackled issues related to 
the importance of institutions and their impact on economic activity in general. The 
presence of legal institutions that safeguard the interests of investors is an integral part 
of financial development. Reforms that bolster a country’s legal environment and 
investor protection are likely to contribute to better growth prospects. 
4. Research Design and Sample selection 
We use the level of discretionary accruals and avoidance of loss reporting as our 
measures of earnings quality. 
4.1 Discretionary Accrual Analysis 
In contrast to Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) who consider the 
nondiscretionary component of total accruals to be constant, Jones (1991) proposes a 
model that relaxes the assumption of constant nondiscretionary accruals. Dechow et 
al. (1995) find that the modified Jones model (1991) provides the most powerful test 
of earnings management. More recently, Bartov et al. (2000) estimate the ability of 
seven accruals models to detect earnings management. Bartov et al. (2000) conclude 
that the cross-sectional Jones model and the cross sectional modified Jones model 
perform better than their time series counterparts in detecting earnings management.  
Other advantages of using these cross-sectional models are larger sample size and a 
lower risk of survivorship bias relative to time series models. We thus use the cross-
sectional modified Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals. 
Estimation of discretionary accruals involves two steps. First nondiscretionary 
accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional variation of the modified Jones model, 
as in Krishnan (2000). This model estimates total accruals as a function of the change 
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in revenue (adjusted for the change in receivables) and the level of property plant and 
equipment. 
 
TAijt /Ait-1 = άjt (1/Ait-1) + β1 (ΔREVit  - ΔRECit /Ait-1) + β2 (PPEit/Ait-1) + eit ……………………………………… (1) 
 
Where TAit is total accruals, ΔREVit  - ΔRECit is the change in revenue (adjusted for the 
change in receivables) of firm i, in industry j, for the period t-1 to t, PPEit is gross property, plant, and 
equipment of firm of firm i, for the period t,  all scaled by lagged total assets. Total accruals are 
calculated as the difference between operating income and cash flow from operations. 
 
Consistent with prior studies, fitted values from model (1) are defined as 
nondiscretionary (expected) accruals. The estimated error term from model (1) (the 
difference between total accruals and nondiscretionary accruals) represents the 
unexplained or discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) rationalize this choice by 
noting that: 
The original Jones model implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over revenue 
in either the estimation period or the event period. The modified version of the Jones 
model implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period result from 
earnings management. This is based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings 
by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than its is to 
manage earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The variables and their measures used in this study are summarized in Table I. 
The models in equation (4) & (5), below, test if the level of discretionary accruals 
(earnings quality) varies as a function of a country’s investor protection environment 
and IFRS adoption (mandatory and voluntary), plus a set of controls for other factors 
that may affect accruals. 
DACCRit = β0 + β1MAN_IFRSit + β2INVPRO + β3MAN_IFRSit*INVPROit + 
β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6GROWTHit + β7CFOit + β8CAPITALINTENSITYit + 
β9LOSSit + fixed effects + eit…. ……………………………………………………………………………….. (4) 
 
where, 
 
DACCRit = discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets for firm i in year t. 
MAN_IFRSit = A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a given country in the 
years after mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. 
INVPROit = investor protection, measured seven ways: 
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1. BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 
0 otherwise. 
2. BOD_IND = index of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). 
3. SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws (WEF 2008). 
4. MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest (WEF 
2008). 
5. ENF_ACC_AUD_STD = enforcement of accounting & auditing standards 
(WEF 2008). 
6. JUD_IND = index of judicial independence (WEF 2008). 
7. PRES_FREE = Voice and accountability (World Bank 2006). 
 
SIZEit =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t, 
LEVit = total long-term debt/total assets for firm i in year t. 
GROWTHit = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and 
scaled by sales in year t-1. 
CFOit = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. 
CAPITALINTENSITYit  = Non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. 
LOSSit = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in year t. 
fixed effects = country and year fixed effects, 
eit = error term. 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1VOL_IFRS it + β2INVPRO + β3VOL_IFRSit*INVPROit + 
β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6GROWTHit + β7CFOit + β8CAPITALINTENSITYit + 
β9LOSSit + fixed effects + eit ………….................................................................... (5) 
 
where, 
 
VOL_IFRSit = A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given country in the 
years after voluntary IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. 
 
The rest of the variables are defined as in equation (4), and the same coefficients (β1, 
β2 and β3) test the effects of investor protection environment and voluntary IFRS 
adoption on the earnings quality. 
 
Control variables, which have been identified in the literature, have been 
included in addition to the explanatory variables. SIZE and LEV are included as 
control variables as Klein (2002) documents that discretionary accruals are negatively 
associated with SIZE and positively associated with LEV. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990) posit that larger companies are more politically visible and thus would engage 
in earnings management to reduce the size of their accruals. Moreover, given that 
companies that are closer to breaking their debt covenants would be more wiling to 
engage in earnings increasing accruals (Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979; Bowen et al 
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1981; Dhaliwal 1988; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Bartov 2002; DeAngelo et al 
1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Sweeney 1994; and Francis and Wang 2008) we 
also predict a positive relationship between LEV and accruals. 
Growth companies are expected to be more willing to engage in income 
increasing earnings management in order to increase the value of their shares, thus 
attracting more investors to meet their capital needs. We include cash flow from 
operations (CFO) deflated by lagged total assets because there is a well documented 
inverse relation between CFO and accruals (Francis and Wang 2008). A dummy 
variable is used for firms with losses (LOSS) as a proxy for financial distress and 
bankruptcy risk and therefore an incentive to increase reported earnings in the 
subsequent year. 
Equation (4) is estimated as a fixed effects model with year-specific dummy 
variables to control for systematic time period effects and country dummies to provide 
additional controls for omitted variables that could affect firm-level accruals. For 
succinctness, the year and industry dummies are not reported in the tables. 
We test equation (5), in order to determine if there is any difference in 
earnings quality resulting from voluntary adoption of IFRS as opposed to mandatory 
adoption. 
4.2. Avoidance of Reporting Loss 
Our second set of tests is based on avoidance of reporting loss as the measure 
of earnings quality. Recent research suggests that managers have strong incentives to 
avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses. (Francis and Wang 2008; Yu 2005; 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Barth et al. 1999; De Angelo et al. 1996). There is a 
considerable literature that establishes the fact that managers in the US and in the UK 
manage earnings to meet or beat targets. This is understandable because stock prices 
 15 
react to earnings surprises and hence managers have incentives to provide positive 
earnings surprises to the market. Further, the substantial stock options granted to US 
and UK managers exacerbate this behaviour because managers are thus more likely to 
inflate earnings numbers to boost stock prices, in order to make windfall gains by 
exercising their options. Another reason why managers tend to manage earnings 
relates to analyst’s forecasts. The market tends to penalize firms heavily for missing 
earnings targets issued by analysts. Thus loss recognition is more likely to occur in 
countries with strong investor protection regimes because the consequences of hiding 
or under reporting losses will be more significant in these countries. 
Equations (6) and (7) are employed to test if loss reporting (earnings quality) 
is affected by a country’s investor protection environment and IFRS adoption 
(mandatory and voluntary), plus a set of control for other factors that may affect the 
avoidance of reporting losses, along with fixed effects for year and country. 
 
P (LOSSit = 1) = β0 + β1MAN_IFRSit + β2 INVPRO + β3MAN_IFRSit*INVPRO + 
β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6GROWTHit + fixed effects + eit …………….................... (6) 
 
and, 
 
P (LOSSit = 1) = β0 + β1VOL_IFRSit + β2 INVPRO + β3VOL_IFRSit*INVPRO + 
β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6GROWTHit + fixed effects + eit …………….................... (7) 
 
 
where, 
 
LOSSit = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in year t. 
 
The rest of the variables are defined as in equation (4), and the same coefficients (β1, 
β2 and β3) test the effects of investor protection environment and voluntary IFRS 
adoption on the avoidance of reporting looses. 
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4.3 Sample Selection 
The financial statement data was extracted from the OSIRIS database for the 
period 1998-2007 and hand collected from annual reports for those variables not 
found on the OSIRIS database. Following prior research (Francis and Wang 2008, and 
Daske et al. 2008); we exclude financial services firms such as banks, insurance 
companies and other financial institutions because it is problematic to compute 
discretionary accruals for such entities. We also exclude utility companies because 
they are regulated and therefore are likely to differ from other companies in respect of 
incentives to manage earnings. We exclude observations where the statements were 
not audited or where there were missing values for the dependent and independent 
variables under study. Finally we exclude observations that fall in the top and bottom 
1% of discretionary accruals, and those with the absolute value of Studentized 
residuals greater than 3 in the discretionary accruals analysis. The trimming procedure 
produces our sample which consists of 115,608 firms-years for the period 1998-2007 
in the discretionary accruals analysis and loss avoidance analysis. The sample 
selection process is summarized in Table 2, and details of the two samples and 
variables used in each of the two tests are reported in Table 3. 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 provide univariate information 
regarding both earnings quality and effect of investor protection and IFRS adoption. 
The mean (median) measure of discretionary accrual (DACCR) in this study is -.1674 
(-.1655). The 25
th
 percentile value of abnormal accruals is -.2756, and the 75
th
 
percentile value is -.0451. Managers of the sample companies engaged in larger 
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decreasing DACCR compared to income increasing DACCR in the choice of 
accounting policies as 81.38 percent of the companies had negative DACCR while the 
other 18.62 percent had positive DACCR. 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
Not surprisingly, there is relatively high correlation among the seven investor 
protection variables reported in Tables 4 and 5. All pair-wise correlations are positive 
and statistically significant at (p<.01).The protection of minority shareholders rights 
has been widely used to measure investor protection in prior research. While viewed 
as a simplistic dichotomy, it is associated with other more specific measures of 
investor protection, with correlations ranging from .153 to .929 in Tables 4 & 5. In 
other words countries with strong minority shareholders protection also have strong 
investor protection through other means, in particular, corporate and securities law. 
5.2. Discretionary Accrual Analysis 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 here] 
 
The discretionary accruals analysis with mandatory IFRS adoption is reported 
in Table 6. Seven regression models are reported in which each investor protection 
variable is tested one at a time.  All models have adjusted R-squares of around 42 
percent; the significance levels of individual coefficients are reported as two-tail p-
values. 
Mandatory IFRS adoption is significantly but positively related to DACCR at 
p<.01 in all models except the model using board independence (which is significant 
at p = .171). This is similar to other studies involving IFRS adoption such as van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), and Lin and Paananen (2007). This result indicates 
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that mandatory adoption of IFRS alone has a negative impact on earnings quality as 
measured by discretionary accruals. 
The investor protection variable by itself represents the effect on accruals as 
investor protection become stricter. The investor protection variable is significant and 
negatively related to DACCR at p<.01 in all seven models. The interaction of investor 
protection with the mandatory IFRS adoption variable measures the effect of adopting 
countries earnings quality relative to non-adopting countries as investor protection 
become stronger. The interaction term has a negative coefficient in all models and 
indicates discretionary accruals of IFRS adopting countries are consistently smaller 
(less income increasing) relative to the accruals of non-adopting countries investor 
protection regime become stronger. The coefficients are significant in all models 
except the BIG 4 auditor and board independence models. Therefore, overall, the 
evidence in Table 6 indicates that discretionary accruals are smaller (less income 
increasing) as a country’s investor protection regime becomes stronger. However, this 
effect is mediated by the country’s choice of adopting IFRS and it turns out that 
discretionary accruals are smaller only if the country adopts IFRS. 
The discretionary accruals analysis with voluntary IFRS adoption is reported 
in Table 7. Seven regression models are reported in which each investor protection 
variable is tested one at a time.  All models have adjusted R-squares of around 42 
percent; the reported significance levels of individual coefficients are reported as two-
tail p-values. Overall, the empirical results are similar to those reported for mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. 
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5.3. Avoidance of loss Analysis 
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 here] 
 
The avoidance of loss analysis is reported in Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 reports 
seven logistic regression models testing for each investor protection variable one at a 
time. All models have Pseudo R-squares of around 32 percent; the reported 
significance levels of individual coefficients are based on two-tail p-values for 
asymptotic z-statistics. 
The investor protection variable is significant at p<.01 in all seven models but 
is positive. The mandatory adoption variable is significant in all cases other than the 
securities law enforcement model.  However, the sign varies across the models. We 
thus conclude that there are no systematic differences in mandatory IFRS adoption 
and non-adopting countries when investor protection is effectively zero. 
The interaction term for investor protection with mandatory IFRS adoption is 
significant and negative in all models. The negative sign indicates that mandatory 
IFRS adopting countries are more likely to report losses than country’s with non-
adopting IFRS as the investor protection regime becomes stronger. 
Table 9 reports the logistic regression models for voluntary adoption of IFRS. 
The voluntary adoption variable is positive in all cases but otherwise the results are  
overall similar to those obtained for mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
5.4. Robustness Tests 
In order to assure that smaller countries with fewer observations do not drive 
the results, we re-estimate the models for the largest countries in the sample having 
200 or more firm-year observations. The results are reported in Tables 10 to 13 and 
are similar to the results reported in Tables 6 to 9 both in terms of the sign and 
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statistical significance on the test variables of interest. We thus conclude that smaller 
countries do not drive the results. 
We perform a test of the economic magnitude of discretionary accruals similar 
to that used by Francis and Wang (2008). To compute the economic magnitude of the 
impact of strong investor protection with IFRS adoption on operating income, we use 
the investor protection variable BIG4 to measure high and low levels of investor 
protection based on the BIG4 versus nonBIG4 distinction. The coefficient on the 
interaction of mandatory IFRS adoption (-.006 in Table 6) measures the average 
magnitude of discretionary accruals, scaled by beginning year total assets, for firms 
with a BIG4 auditor versus a non-BIG4 auditor in mandatory IFRS adopting 
countries. We use this coefficient to derive a percentage effect on median operating 
income, adjusting for median beginning year total assets. This calculation results in an 
average reduction of -5.47 percent in median operating income for a firm with BIG 4 
auditor in IFRS adopting countries compared with non-BIG4 auditor. 
The sub sample of firms with BIG 4 auditor is also used to compute the 
economic magnitude of the impact of strong investor protection with IFRS adoption 
on operating income. Following the same procedure discussed above, this calculation 
results in lower median operating income of -4.85 percent of firms with BIG4 auditors 
in IFRS adopting countries. 
We also compute the impact of investor protection and IFRS adoption on the 
likelihood that firms report losses. To do this we calculate the expected probability of 
a loss based on median values of the variables in the model. This calculation results in 
a loss likelihood of 7.41 percent for a Big 4 client in an IFRS adopting countries 
country versus 20.56 percent for non-Big 4 clients in an IFRS adopting country. In the 
sub sample of firms with Big 4 auditors, the likelihood of reporting a loss decreases 
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from 11.78 percent in an IFRS adopting country to 8.34 percent in a non adopting 
country, a decrease of 3.44 percentage points. 
In summary, our evidence indicates that in weaker investor protection settings 
firms appear to have greater discretion over discretionary accruals to manage earnings 
and losses; even if the country has adopted IFRS. 
7. Conclusion 
This study reinforces the findings of other cross-country studies that earnings 
are of relatively higher quality in countries with strong legal systems and investor 
protection regimes. For example, there is evidence of less earnings management 
(Francis and Wang 2008), greater value relevance (Hung 2000), and greater earnings 
conservatism (Ball et al. 2000) in countries with strong investor protection regime.  
However, our result suggests that IFRS adoption per se doest not lead to increased 
earnings quality, at least based on the earnings attributes analysed in our study. 
Specifically, accounting earnings quality is greater as investor protection regimes 
become stronger, but only for IFRS adopting countries. This evidence shows that the 
effect of investor protection is mediated through the adoption of IFRS. In other words, 
the effect of investor protection seems to be an indirect one that works through the 
incentives on adoption of IFRS. These results are consistent with Luez et al. (2003); 
La Porta et al. (1998; 2000; 2002; 2006); Francis and Wang (2008), and Ball et al. 
(2003) who conclude that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary 
condition for acquiring high quality information, without being a sufficient one. The 
results highlight the importance of accounting enforcement in promoting earnings 
quality even given high quality standards. 
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Table 1: Descriptions of variables 
 
Variable                                     Measure                                                  Description                                                       Data Source 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
Earnings Quality 
 
DACCR 
 
Discretionary accruals (DACCR) for each firm is defined as 
the residual from the regression of total accruals (the 
difference between cash flow from operations (CFO) and 
Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT)) on three factors that 
explain non-discretionary accruals, the increase in revenue, 
the level of receivables and the level of depreciable fixed 
assets using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al 1995). 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
Independent variables 
 
 
Investor protection 
 
 
Firm-level 
characteristic 
 
Auditor Quality 
 
 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm is audited by 
one of the BIG 4 auditors and otherwise 0. 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board Independence 
 
Measure of corporate governance by investors and boards of 
directors in the country and ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 
signifies management has little accountability and 7 signifies 
investors and boards exert strong supervision of management 
decisions. 
 
 
World Economic Forum 
(2008) 
 
Securities law 
enforcement 
 
Aggregate measure of regulation of securities exchanges in 
the respective country and ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 
signifies not transparent, ineffective and subject to under 
 
World Economic Forum 
(2008) 
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Country-level 
characteristics 
 
influence from industry and government, and 7 signifies 
transparent, effective and independent from undue influence 
from industry and government. 
 
 
Protection of  minority 
shareholders right 
 
Measures of minority shareholders interest protection and 
ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies not protected by law and 
7 signifies protected by law and actively enforced. 
 
 
World Economic Forum 
(2008) 
 
Enforcement of 
accounting and 
auditing Standards 
 
Measures enforcement of auditing and financial reporting 
standards regarding company financial performance and 
ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies extremely weak and 7 
signifies extremely strong. 
 
 
World Economic Forum 
(2008) 
 
Judicial Independence 
 
 
Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects business. Ranges from 1 to 7; with 
lower scores at lower efficiency levels. 
 
 
World Economic Forum 
(2008) 
 
Press freedom 
 
Measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association and a free media. 
 
 
World Bank (2006) 
  
Mandatory IFRS 
adoption 
 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years after 
mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. 
 
Deloite IAS Plus Website 
(2008) 
  
Voluntary IFRS 
adoption 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years after 
voluntary IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Deloite IAS Plus Website 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
SIZE 
 
 
Log of firm total assets 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
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Control Variables 
 
LEV 
 
Total long-term debt/Total Assets 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
ROE 
 
Net income / Total equity 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
CFO 
 
Cash flow from operations 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
CAPITALINTENSITY 
 
Non-current (fixed) assets/ Total assets 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
LOSS 
 
Takes the value 1 if Net income for the period is negative and 
0 otherwise. 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
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Table 2 
 
Sample selection 
 
 
Observations with missing values on dependent and independent variables for 1998-2007:       505594 
 
Less: Observations from countries not in the list of the WEF report (2008)                                 (46298) 
Less: Missing values on dependent and independent variables                               (292644) 
Less: Financial Institution and energy sector                                                                                 (20522) 
Less: Top and bottom 1% of DACCR accruals                                                                              (17844) 
Less: Observations with │Studentized residuals│>3                                                                     (12678) 
 
Number of observations used in the tests                                                                                      115608 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25
th 
Percentile 
Median 75
th
 
Percentile 
DACCR -.1674 .24671 -.2756 -.1655 -.0451 
SIZE 5.0947 .87530 4.4860 5.0729 5.6822 
LEV .4662 .97262 .0114 .1806 .5956 
GROWTH .0064 .59211 -.0089 .0754 .1621 
CFO .0346 .19479 -.0132 .0564 .1249 
CAPITAL 
INTENSITY 
.3377 .24747 .1311 .2868 .4986 
LOSS .30 .459 .00 .00 1.00 
 
Note: DACCR is the signed discretionary accruals. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in 
$ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-term debt/total assets for firm i in year t. 
GROWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales 
in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. 
CAPITALINTENSITY = Non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = 
dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 
 
Pearson correlations of Investor Protection and Mandatory IFRS adoption 
 
 
BOD_IND SEC_ENF 
MIN_SH_PR
OT 
ENF_ACC_
AUD_STD JUD_IND PRES_FREE MAN_IFRS 
BIG4 .254 .153 .192 .223 .176 .277 .033 
(<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
BOD_IND  .867 .905 .909 .741 .818 .184 
 (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
SEC_ENF   .855 .870 .681 .793 .169 
  (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
MIN_SH_PROT    .929 .754 .738 .177 
   (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
ENF_ACC_AUD
_STD 
    .823 .802 .229 
    (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
JUD_IND      .654 .243 
     (<.01) (<.01) 
PRES_FREE       .120 
      (<.01) 
 
 
Note: p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. 
BOD_IND = index of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws 
index (WEF 2008). MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest index (WEF 
2008). ENF_ACC_AUD_STD = Enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). 
JUD_IND = index of Judicial independence (WEF 2008). PRES_FREE = Voice and 
accountability index (The World Bank 2006). 
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Table 5 
 
Pearson correlations of Investor Protection and Voluntary IFRS adoption 
 
 
BOD_IND SEC_ENF 
MIN_SH_P
ROT 
ENF_ACC_
AUD_STD JUD_IND PRES_FREE VOL_IFRS 
BIG4 .254 .153 .192 .223 .176 .277 .019 
(<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
BOD_IND  .867 .905 .909 .741 .818 -.042 
 (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
SEC_ENF   .855 .870 .681 .793 .018 
  (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
MIN_SH_PROT    .929 .754 .738 -.026 
   (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
ENF_ACC_AUD
_STD 
    .823 .802 .003 
    (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
JUD_IND      .654 .033 
     (<.01) (<.01) 
PRES_FREE       .026 
      (<.01) 
 
 
Note: p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
BIG4 equals 1 if the firm audited by one of the BIG 4 and otherwise 0. BOD_IND is the efficacy of 
corporate board’s scores from World Economic Forum (2008).  SEC _ENF is the regulations of 
securities exchange scores from World Economic Forum (2008). MIN_SH_PROT is the protection 
of minority shareholders interest scores from World Economic Forum (2008). 
ENF_ACC_AUD_STD is the enforcement of Accounting & Auditing Standards scores from World 
Economic Forum (2008).  JUD_IND is the judicial independence scores from World Economic 
Forum (2008). PRES_FREE scores from The World Bank (2006). 
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Table 6 
Regression Analysis of Discretionary Accruals with Mandatory IFRS adoption 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1MAN_IFRS it + β2INVPRO + β3MAN_IFRSit*INVPRO + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + 
β6GROWTHit + β7CFOit + β8CAPITALINTENSITYit + β9LOSSit + fixed effects + eit 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Investor 
protection = 
BIG4 
Investor 
protection = 
BOD_INDE 
Investor 
protection = 
SEC _ENF 
Investor 
protection = 
MIN_SH_RIG
HT 
Investor 
protection = 
ENF_ACC_A
UD_STD 
Investor 
protection 
= 
JUD_IND 
Investor 
protection 
= 
PRES_FR
EE 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.331 
(<0.01) 
-.192 
(<0.01) 
-.302 
(<0.01) 
-.249 
(<0.01) 
-.246 
(<0.01) 
-.280 
(<0.01) 
-.317 
(<0.01) 
MAN_IFRS .017 
(<0.01) 
.029 
(.171) 
.085 
(<0.01) 
.054 
(<0.01) 
.070 
(<0.01) 
.042 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
INVPRO -.013 
(<0.01) 
-.026 
(<0.01) 
-.004 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
-.009 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
MAN_FRS* 
INVPRO 
-.006 
(.086) 
-.001 
(.699) 
-.012 
(<0.01) 
-.006 
(.033) 
-.008 
(<0.01) 
-.004 
(.051) 
-.008 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.019 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
GROWTH .054 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.054 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.402 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.391 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.404 
(<0.01) 
CAPITALINTE
NSITY 
.463 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.465 
(<0.01) 
.463 
(<0.01) 
.462 
(<0.01) 
.463 
(<0.01) 
.458 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.140 
(<0.01) 
 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.140 
(<0.01) 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.140 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
Adj. R
2 
.417 .418 .415 .416 .416 .416 .419 
N 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country 
clustering effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country 
dummies have not been reported. 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. BOD_IND = index 
of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws index (WEF 2008). 
MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest index (WEF 2008). ENF_ACC_AUD_STD 
= Enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). JUD_IND = index of Judicial independence 
(WEF 2008). PRES_FREE = Voice and accountability index (The World Bank 2006). DACCR = 
discretionary accruals scaled by beginning year total assets. VOL_IFRS = A dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 for a given country in years after voluntary IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. DACCR is the signed 
discretionary accruals. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total 
long-term debt/total assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t 
minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by 
lagged total assets. CAPITALINTENSITY = Non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. 
LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7 
 
Regression Analysis of Discretionary Accruals with Voluntary IFRS adoption 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1VOL_IFRS it + β2INVPRO + β3VOL_IFRSit*INVPRO + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + 
β6GROWTHit + β7CFOit + β8CAPITALINTENSITYit + β9LOSSit + fixed effects + eit 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Investor 
protection = 
BIG4 
Investor 
protection = 
BOD_INDE 
Investor 
protection = 
SEC _ENF 
Investor 
protection = 
MIN_SH_RIG
HT 
Investor 
protection = 
ENF_ACC_
AUD_STD 
Investor 
protection = 
JUD_IND 
Investor 
protection = 
PRES_FRE
E 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.330 
(<0.01) 
-.202 
(<0.01) 
-.305 
(<0.01) 
-.254 
(<0.01) 
-.256 
(<0.01) 
-.286 
(<0.01) 
-.316 
(<0.01) 
VOL_ IFRS .025 
(<0.01) 
.123 
(.100) 
.463 
(.001) 
.284 
(.007) 
.158 
(.022) 
.113 
(.017) 
.059 
(<0.01) 
INVPRO -.013 
(<0.01) 
-.024 
(<0.01) 
-.004 
(<0.01) 
-.013 
(<0.01) 
-.012 
(<0.01) 
-.009 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
VOL_IFRS* 
INVPRO 
-.010 
(.196) 
-.027 
(.065) 
-.084 
(.001) 
-.058 
(.005) 
-.029 
(.016) 
-.021 
(.012) 
-.022 
(.001) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.019 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
GROWTH .055 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.054 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.402 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.391 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.403 
(<0.01) 
CAPITALINT
ENSITY 
.462 
(<0.01) 
.459 
(<0.01) 
.464 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.458 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.140 
(<0.01) 
 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.141 
(<0.01) 
-.139 
(<0.01) 
-.139 
(<0.01) 
-.141 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
Adj. R
2 
.417 .417 .415 .416 .416 .416 .419 
N 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering 
effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not 
been reported. 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. BOD_IND = 
index of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws index (WEF 
2008). MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest index (WEF 2008). 
ENF_ACC_AUD_STD = Enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). JUD_IND = 
index of Judicial independence (WEF 2008). PRES_FREE = Voice and accountability index (The 
World Bank 2006). DACCR = discretionary accruals scaled by beginning year total assets. VOL_IFRS 
= A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given country in years after voluntary IFRS adoption and 
0 otherwise. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-
term debt/total assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t 
minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by 
lagged total assets. CAPITALINTENSITYit = Non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year 
t. LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 8 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Loss Avoidance with Mandatory IFRS adoption 
(Dependent variable is the probability of reporting loss: P (Loss = 1)) 
 
P (LOSSit = 1) = β0 + β1MAN_IFRSit + β2 INVPRO + β3MAN_IFRSit*INVPRO + β4SIZEit + 
β5LEVit + β6GROWTHit + fixed effects + eit 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Investor 
protection = 
BIG4 
Investor 
protection = 
BOD_INDE 
Investor 
protection = 
SEC _ENF 
Investor 
protection = 
MIN_SH_RI
GHT 
Investor 
protection = 
ENF_ACC_A
UD_STD 
Investor 
protection = 
JUD_IND 
Investor 
protection = 
PRES_FREE 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant 2.200 
(<0.01) 
-.974 
(<0.01) 
.806 
(<0.01) 
-.226 
(.032) 
-.011 
(.910) 
1.887 
(<0.01) 
2.029 
(<0.01) 
MAN_IFRS -.117 
(<0.01) 
1.447 
(<0.01) 
.180 
(.602) 
.869 
(<0.01) 
.806 
(.030) 
-.968 
(<0.01) 
-.285 
(<0.01) 
INVPRO .149 
(<0.01) 
.594 
(<0.01) 
.228 
(<0.01) 
.427 
(<0.01) 
.371 
(<0.01) 
.040 
(<0.01) 
.357 
(<0.01) 
MAN_IFRS* 
INVPRO 
-.216 
(<0.01) 
-.339 
(<0.01) 
-.090 
(.130) 
-.228 
(<0.01) 
-.207 
(<0.01) 
.118 
(<0.01) 
-.077 
(.080) 
SIZE -.701 
(<0.01) 
-.665 
(<0.01) 
-.645 
(<0.01) 
-.638 
(<0.01) 
-.643 
(<0.01) 
.657 
(<0.01) 
-.698 
(<0.01) 
LEV 1.841 
(<0.01) 
1.657 
(<0.01) 
1.695 
(<0.01) 
1.590 
(<0.01) 
1.611 
(<0.01) 
1.761 
(<0.01) 
1.713 
(<0.01) 
GROWTH -2.969 
(<0.01) 
-2.735 
(<0.01) 
-2.788 
(<0.01) 
-2.753 
(<0.01) 
-2.759 
(<0.01) 
-2.796 
(<0.01) 
-2.896 
(<0.01) 
Negelkerke R 
Square
 
.314 .318 .310 .315 .315 .308 ..308 
N 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country 
clustering effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country 
dummies have not been reported. 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. BOD_IND 
= index of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws index 
(WEF 2008). MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest index (WEF 2008). 
ENF_ACC_AUD_STD = Enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). JUD_IND 
= index of Judicial independence (WEF 2008). PRES_FREE = Voice and accountability index (The 
World Bank 2006). LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current 
year and 0 otherwise. MAN_IFRS = A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given country in 
years after voluntary IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in 
$ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV = total long-term debt/total assets for firm i in year t. 
GROWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales 
in year t. 
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Table 9 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Loss Avoidance with Voluntary IFRS adoption 
(Dependent variable is the probability of reporting loss: P (LOSS = 1)) 
 
P (LOSSit = 1) = β0 + β1VOL_IFRSit + β2 INVPRO + β3VOL_IFRSit*INVPRO + β4SIZEit + 
β5LEVit + β6GROWTHit + fixed effects + eit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Investor 
protection = 
BIG4 
Investor 
protection = 
BOD_INDE 
Investor 
protection = 
SEC _ENF 
Investor 
protection = 
MIN_SH_R
IGHT 
Investor 
protection = 
ENF_ACC_A
UD_STD 
Investor 
protection 
= 
JUD_IND 
Investor 
protection = 
PRES_FREE 
Freedom 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant 2.182 
(<0.01) 
-.579 
(<0.01) 
.971 
(<0.01) 
.089 
(.371) 
.309 
(.001) 
1.924 
(<0.01) 
2.008 
(<0.01) 
VOL_IFRS .177 
(.075) 
1.345 
(<0.01) 
2.634 
(<0.01) 
1.921 
(<0.01) 
1.232 
(<0.01) 
2.932 
(<0.01) 
.005 
(.971) 
INVPRO .137 
(<0.01) 
.510 
(<0.01) 
.194 
(<0.01) 
.363 
(<0.01) 
.309 
(<0.01) 
.030 
(<0.01) 
.333 
(<0.01) 
VOL_IFRS* 
INVPRO 
-.808 
(<0.01) 
-1.511 
(<0.01) 
-1.930 
<0.01) 
-1.776 
(<0.01) 
-1.128 
(<0.01) 
-.596 
(<0.01) 
-.350 
(<0.01) 
SIZE -.700 
(<0.01) 
-.664 
(<0.01) 
-.648 
(<0.01) 
-.641 
(<0.01) 
-.646 
(<0.01) 
.659 
(<0.01) 
-.696 
(<0.01) 
LEV 1.846 
(<0.01) 
1.697 
(<0.01) 
1.726 
(<0.01) 
1.638 
(<0.01) 
1.662 
(<0.01) 
1.781 
(<0.01) 
1.730 
(<0.01) 
GROWTH -2.975 
(<0.01) 
-2.757 
(<0.01) 
-2.801 
(<0.01) 
-2.772 
(<0.01) 
-2.780 
(<0.01) 
-2.808 
(<0.01) 
-2.910 
(<0.01) 
Negelkerke R 
Square
 
.314 .315 .309 .313 .312 .307 .322 
N 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 115608 
 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country 
clustering effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country 
dummies have not been reported. 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. 
BOD_IND = index of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws 
index (WEF 2008). MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest index (WEF 
2008). ENF_ACC_AUD_STD = Enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). 
JUD_IND = index of Judicial independence (WEF 2008). PRES_FREE = Voice and 
accountability index (The World Bank 2006).  LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports 
negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. VOL_IFRS = A dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 for a given country in years after voluntary IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. SIZE 
=natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV = total long-term 
debt/total assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t 
minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. 
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Robustness Test (Tables 10-13) 
 
Table 10 
Regression Analysis of Discretionary Accruals with Mandatory IFRS adoption (Large countries) 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1MAN_IFRS it + β2INVPRO + β3MAN_IFRSit*INVPRO + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + 
β6GROWTHit + β7CFOit + β8CAPITALINTENSITYit + β9LOSSit + fixed effects + eit 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Investor 
protection = 
BIG4 
Investor 
protection = 
BOD_INDE 
Investor 
protection = 
SEC _ENF 
Investor 
protection = 
MIN_SH_RI
GHT 
Investor 
protection = 
ENF_ACC_A
UD_STD 
Investor 
protection = 
JUD_IND 
Investor 
protection = 
PRES_FREE 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.331 
(<0.01) 
-.192 
(<0.01) 
-.303 
(<0.01) 
-.250 
(<0.01) 
-.247 
(<0.01) 
-.280 
(<0.01) 
-.318 
(<0.01) 
MAN_IFRS .017 
(<0.01) 
.036 
(.100) 
.089 
(<0.01) 
.059 
(<0.01) 
.078 
(<0.01) 
.051 
(<0.01) 
.027 
(<0.01) 
INVPRO -.013 
(<0.01) 
-.026 
(<0.01) 
-.004 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
-.009 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
MAN_FRS* 
INVPRO 
-.006 
(.099) 
-.003 
(.496) 
-.013 
(<0.01) 
-.007 
(.016) 
-.010 
(<0.01) 
-.005 
(.010) 
-.009 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.019 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
GROWTH .054 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.054 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.401 
(<0.01) 
-.388 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.389 
(<0.01) 
-.388 
(<0.01) 
-.389 
(<0.01) 
-.402 
(<0.01) 
CAPITALINTE
NSITY 
.463 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.465 
(<0.01) 
.463 
(<0.01) 
.462 
(<0.01) 
.463 
(<0.01) 
.458 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.140 
(<0.01) 
 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.140 
(<0.01) 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.140 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
Adj. R
2 
.416 .417 .415 .416 .416 .416 .419 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering 
effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on the year and country dummies have 
not been reported. 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. BOD_IND = 
index of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws index (WEF 
2008). MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest index (WEF 2008). 
ENF_ACC_AUD_STD = Enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). JUD_IND = 
index of Judicial independence (WEF 2008). PRES_FREE = Voice and accountability index (The 
World Bank 2006). DACCR = discretionary accruals scaled by beginning year total assets. VOL_IFRS 
= A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given country in years after voluntary IFRS adoption and 
0 otherwise. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-
term debt/total assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t 
minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by 
lagged total assets. CAPITALINTENSITYit = Non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year 
t. LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 11 
 
Regression Analysis of Discretionary Accruals with Voluntary IFRS adoption (Large 
countries) 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1VOL_IFRS it + β2INVPRO + β3VOL_IFRSit*INVPRO + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + 
β6GROWTHit + β7CFOit + β8CAPITALINTENSITYit + β9LOSSit + fixed effects + eit 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Investor 
protection = 
BIG4 
Investor 
protection = 
BOD_INDE 
Investor 
protection = 
SEC _ENF 
Investor 
protection = 
MIN_SH_RI
GHT 
Investor 
protection = 
ENF_ACC_
AUD_STD 
Investor 
protection = 
JUD_IND 
Investor 
protection = 
PRES_FREE 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.330 
(<0.01) 
-.203 
(<0.01) 
-.306 
(<0.01) 
-.254 
(<0.01) 
-.256 
(<0.01) 
-.286 
(<0.01) 
-.316 
(<0.01) 
VOL_ IFRS .044 
(<0.01) 
.124 
(.098) 
.465 
(<0.01) 
.285 
(<0.01) 
.159 
(.021) 
.113 
(.018) 
.060 
(<0.01) 
INVPRO -.013 
(<0.01) 
-.024 
(<0.01) 
-.004 
(<0.01) 
-.013 
(<0.01) 
-.012 
(<0.01) 
-.008 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
VOL_IFRS* 
INVPRO 
-.010 
(.201) 
-.028 
(.063) 
-.084 
(<0.01) 
-.058 
(<0.01) 
-.029 
(.015) 
-.021 
(.012) 
-.022 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.019 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
GROWTH .054 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.054 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.401 
(<0.01) 
-.388 
(<0.01) 
-.390 
(<0.01) 
-.388 
(<0.01) 
-.388 
(<0.01) 
-.389 
(<0.01) 
-.402 
(<0.01) 
CAPITALINT
ENSITY 
.462 
(<0.01) 
.459 
(<0.01) 
.464 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.457 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.140 
(<0.01) 
 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.141 
(<0.01) 
-.139 
(<0.01) 
-.139 
(<0.01) 
-.141 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
Adj. R
2 
.416 .417 .414 .415 .415 .415 .418 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering 
effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not 
been reported. 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. BOD_IND = 
index of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws index (WEF 
2008). MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest index (WEF 2008). 
ENF_ACC_AUD_STD = Enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). JUD_IND = 
index of Judicial independence (WEF 2008). PRES_FREE = Voice and accountability index (The 
World Bank 2006). DACCR = discretionary accruals scaled by beginning year total assets. VOL_IFRS 
= A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given country in years after voluntary IFRS adoption and 
0 otherwise. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-
term debt/total assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t 
minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by 
lagged total assets. CAPITALINTENSITYit = Non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year 
t. LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 12 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Loss Avoidance with Mandatory IFRS adoption (Large 
countries) 
(Dependent variable is the probability of reporting loss: P (LOSS = 1)) 
 
P (LOSSit = 1) = β0 + β1MAN_IFRSit + β2 INVPRO + β3MAN_IFRSit*INVPRO + β4SIZEit + 
β5LEVit + β6GROWTHit + fixed effects + eit 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables 
Investor 
protection = 
BIG4 
Investor 
protection = 
BOD_INDE 
Investor 
protection = 
SEC _ENF 
Investor 
protection = 
MIN_SH_R
IGHT 
Investor 
protection = 
ENF_ACC_
AUD_STD 
Investor 
protection = 
JUD_IND 
Investor 
protection = 
PRES_FRE
E 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant 2.348 
(<0.01) 
-.961 
(<0.01) 
.824 
(<0.01) 
-.214 
(.044) 
-.006 
(.951) 
1.885 
(<0.01) 
2.030 
(<0.01) 
MAN_IFRS -.116 
(.007) 
1.578 
(<0.01) 
.316 
(.367) 
.951 
(.002) 
.910 
(.016) 
-.979 
(<0.01) 
-.271 
(<0.01) 
INVPRO .148 
(<0.01) 
.591 
(<0.01) 
.225 
(<0.01) 
.425 
(<0.01) 
.370 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.355 
(<0.01) 
MAN_IFRS* INVPRO -.210 
(<0.01) 
-.362 
(<0.01) 
-.113 
(.062) 
-.242 
(<0.01) 
-.223 
(.001) 
.120 
(.002) 
-.087 
(.052 
SIZE -.700 
(<0.01) 
-.665 
(<0.01) 
-.645 
(<0.01) 
-.637 
(<0.01) 
-.643 
(<0.01) 
.657 
(<0.01) 
-.698 
(<0.01) 
LEV 1.841 
(<0.01) 
1.657 
(<0.01) 
1.695 
(<0.01) 
1.590 
(<0.01) 
1.611 
(<0.01) 
1.760 
(<0.01) 
1.715 
(<0.01) 
GROWTH -2.963 
(<0.01) 
-2.730 
(<0.01) 
-2.782 
(<0.01) 
-2.748 
(<0.01) 
-2.753 
(<0.01) 
-2.790 
(<0.01) 
-2.892 
(<0.01) 
Negelkerke R Square
 
.314 .317 .310 .315 .314 .314 .323 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering 
effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not 
been reported. 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. BOD_IND = 
index of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws index (WEF 
2008). MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest index (WEF 2008). 
ENF_ACC_AUD_STD = Enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). JUD_IND = 
index of Judicial independence (WEF 2008). PRES_FREE = Voice and accountability index (The 
World Bank 2006). LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current 
year and 0 otherwise. MAN_IFRS = A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given country in years 
after voluntary IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands 
for firm i in year t. LEV = total long-term debt/total assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH = sales 
growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. 
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Table 13 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Loss Avoidance with Voluntary IFRS adoption (Large countries) 
(Dependent variable is the probability of reporting loss: P (LOSS = 1)) 
 
P (LOSSit = 1) = β0 + β1VOL_IFRSit + β2 INVPRO + β3VOL_IFRSit*INVPRO + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit 
+ β6GROWTHit + fixed effects + eit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Investor 
protection = 
BIG4 
Investor 
protection = 
BOD_INDE 
Investor 
protection = 
SEC _ENF 
Investor 
protection 
= 
MIN_SH_
RIGHT 
Investor 
protection = 
ENF_ACC_
AUD_STD 
Investor 
protection = 
JUD_IND 
Investor 
protection = 
PRES_FREE 
Freedom 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant 2.319 
(<0.01) 
-.557 
(<0.01) 
.996 
(<0.01) 
.108 
(.279) 
.318 
(.001) 
1.925 
(<0.01) 
2.008 
(<0.01) 
VOL_IFRS .174 
(.079) 
1.345 
(<0.01) 
2.795 
(<0.01) 
1.920 
(<0.01) 
1.232 
(<0.01) 
2.928 
(<0.01) 
.001 
(.995) 
INVPRO -137 
(<0.01) 
.506 
(<0.01) 
.190 
(<0.01) 
.360 
(<0.01) 
.307 
(<0.01) 
.030 
(.002) 
.330 
(<0.01) 
VOL_IFRS* 
INVPRO 
-.808 
(<0.01) 
-1.506 
(<0.01) 
-1.925 
<0.01) 
-1.772 
(<0.01) 
-1.126 
(<0.01) 
-.596 
(<0.01) 
-.347 
(.004) 
SIZE -.699 
(<0.01) 
-.664 
(<0.01) 
-.647 
(<0.01) 
-.641 
(<0.01) 
-.646 
(<0.01) 
.658 
(<0.01) 
-.696 
(<0.01) 
LEV 1.845 
(<0.01) 
1.697 
(<0.01) 
1.726 
(<0.01) 
1.639 
(<0.01) 
1.662 
(<0.01) 
1.780 
(<0.01) 
1.731 
(<0.01) 
GROWTH -2.969 
(<0.01) 
-2.752 
(<0.01) 
-2.795 
(<0.01) 
-2.767 
(<0.01) 
-2.773 
(<0.01) 
-2.802 
(<0.01) 
-2.906) 
(<0.01) 
Negelkerke R 
Square
 
.314 .315 .309 .313 .312 .307 .322 
 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country 
clustering effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country 
dummies have not been reported. 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a BIG4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. BOD_IND = 
index of board effectiveness (WEF 2008). SEC_ENF= enforcement of securities laws index (WEF 
2008). MIN_SH_RIGHT = protection of minority shareholders interest index (WEF 2008). 
ENF_ACC_AUD_STD = Enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). JUD_IND = 
index of Judicial independence (WEF 2008). PRES_FREE = Voice and accountability index (The 
World Bank 2006).  LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current 
year and 0 otherwise. VOL_IFRS = A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given country in 
years after voluntary IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in 
$ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV = total long-term debt/total assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH 
= sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. 
 
 
 
 
